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Introduction
Transforming from a nearly failed state
in the latter half of the 1900s to a comeback suc-
cess in the early 2000s, Colombia has undergone
enormous social, economic, and political
changes throughout the past few decades. The
implementation of a universal healthcare pro-
gram remains a crucial aspect of the improved
Colombian state along with the application of
human rights laws and development of height-
ened security. Colombia’s universal health-
care, a feat that many of today’s advanced coun-
tries have yet to achieve, provides access to
services for nearly all citizens. With a 97 percent
coverage rate in 2012, Colombia is close to
reaching the goal of complete coverage (Web-
ster, p. E289).
As part of a larger social program agenda
in 1991, President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo intro-
duced a universal healthcare plan to end inef-
ficiency and equity problems in healthcare.
Incorporated within the 1993 Colombian Con-
stitution, all citizens are entitled to derecho a
la salud (the right to healthcare), whereby “all
citizens, irrespective of their ability to pay are
entitled to a comprehensive health benefit pack-
age” (El Congreso . . .). With a predetermined
healthcare budget, however, spending is limited;
and the important question arises of how to best
utilize healthcare expenditures to create maxi-
mum results. This article evaluates the overall
effectiveness of the universal healthcare system
in Colombia and analyzes four main struc-
tural inefficiencies within the universal health-
care system, which significantly hinder its
success. The article also proposes fiscal solutions
to the inefficiencies present in universal health-
care in Colombia.
Background of the Colombian
Healthcare System
Prior to the 1993 healthcare reform,
Colombian healthcare was segmented into 
three separate systems, which were all utilized
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simultaneously: the public system, the insur-
ance system, and the private system. The pub-
lic system was a government-financed opera-
tion, aimed at low-income and unemployed
citizens not protected by any type of health
insurance. Public care centers were financed
directly through government spending, receiv-
ing subsidies for treatments and medications
supplied to patients. This type of funding direct
from the government to care centers is known
as supply-side healthcare financing (Clavijo and
Torrente, p. 538). Because an estimated 70
percent of the population in 1985 was reliant on
a small pool of resources in the public financ-
ing system, inefficiencies and inequities existed
in the provision of healthcare services (Gaviria
et al., p. 30). The insurance system was aimed
at those Colombians in formal employment1 and
was financed by payroll contributions from
employees and employers. Lastly, the private
system served high-income individuals, who
were billed directly for their own medical insur-
ance. The incentive to be enrolled in the private
system was that it provided a higher quality of
care and better access to health services. High
levels of inequality existed in the pre-reform sys-
tem, in that access to complete healthcare serv-
ices was extremely limited for those enrolled
in the public system. 
Healthcare coverage prior to 1993 was
ineffective both in terms of equity and financ-
ing. Before the 1993 reform, an estimated 25
percent of the population was not able to access
healthcare services under the public system
because insufficient healthcare infrastructure,
human resources, and medical goods prevented
individuals from physically receiving care (Plaza
et al., p. 48). Additionally, an estimated 60
percent of hospital admissions were from pri-
vately covered citizens, suggesting a relatively
expensive healthcare system in terms of the cost
of care and treatment (Miller et al.). With sub-
stantial income inequality problems, an expen-
sive healthcare system was not suited to the
aggregate healthcare needs of the Colombian
population (Clavijo and Torrente). Low levels of
insurance coverage further contributed to
inequities in healthcare provisions.
The pre-reform system relied on three
sources of financing—general tax revenue, pay-
roll contributions, and personal expenditures.
However, these three financing mechanisms
were not efficiently organized, in that they were
not pooled into one financing mechanism. Addi-
tionally, financing mechanisms prior to the
1993 reform were ineffective because there were
no specific health funds allocated within the
national budget (Glassman et al., p. 161). 
The 1993 Reform: Creation of
Universal Coverage
Often referred to as one of the largest
social reforms ever undertaken in Latin Amer-
ica, the 1993 Colombian health reform was
implemented under Law 100 of the constitution
to create universal healthcare coverage through
the immediate development of a subsidized
healthcare system (Gaviria et al., p. 7). In this
case, healthcare coverage is defined as access to
a predetermined package of basic health 
services. The predetermined package of benefits
provides financial protection for individuals 
by spreading the financial risks of healthcare
among a large group (Giedion and Uribe, 
p. 860). 
Although Colombian government officials
set the goal of achieving 100 percent cover-
age, Colombia has yet to experience full health-
care coverage. Nonetheless, Colombia has
achieved significant progress, with an estimated
coverage rate of 97 percent as of 2012 (Webster,
p. E289). The expansion of coverage from the
beginning of the 1990s to 2006 represents an
increase of 84 percent in urban areas and a near
sevenfold increase in rural areas (Clavijo and
Torrente).
The 1993 reform divided Colombian
healthcare into two separate regimes, the Con-
tributive Regime (CR), known as the Plan Oblig-
atorio de Salud, and the Subsidized Regime
(SR), known as the Plan Obligatorio de Salud
Subsidiado. The CR was created as a system 
by which formal sector workers and their
employers would contribute a predetermined
percentage of earned income directly to insur-
ance carriers. The overall tax rate is 12.5 per-
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1Formal employment is defined as working for a com-
pany registered with the state and within the guidelines
of state regulation. Under formal employment, income is
reported to the government and thus taxed (Mance).
Informal employment is defined as working outside the gov-
ernment-regulated sector.
cent, with 4 percent paid by the employee and
8.5 percent paid by the employer (Tsai, p. 110).
Both employee and employer contributions
are paid directly to an insurance company,
which the employees themselves are allowed
to individually select. Upon receiving a payroll
contribution, the insurance company is man-
dated to deduct 1.5 percent of the total contri-
bution, known as the solidarity point, to trans-
fer to SR funding (Gaviria et al.). All formal
sector workers are allowed to participate in
the CR. The CR package includes all levels of
care provision, including preventative care, pub-
lic health education, outpatient services, dental
care, maternity and sickness leaves, and cata-
strophic care (Pinto and Hsiao). 
The SR, on the other hand, was created
for those without insurance and otherwise
unable to afford health expenditures out of
pocket. Like other progressive taxation princi-
ples in Colombia, the SR system gives bene-
fits only to those most in need. Only Colom-
bians identified as in the worst economic
condition are allowed to enroll in the SR. Ben-
eficiaries of the SR receive subsidies to pur-
chase a limited package of health insurance
benefits at the same rates available to those
in the CR from one of multiple insurance
carriers (Miller et al.). The package of health-
care benefits offered by the SR covers only pri-
mary and catastrophic care, with limited pro-
visions for hospital care and maternity and
sickness leaves (Pinto and Hsiao). 
The SR is funded through government
taxes plus the solidarity point contributed by CR
members as a fraction of their employment
taxes. Once collected, government health taxes
are transferred from the national government
to regional entities. The total annual cost to the
government of providing healthcare coverage to
the estimated six million people under the 
SR is USD $1.3 billion, or about 1 percent of
Colombia’s overall GDP in 2005 (Gaviria et al.,
p. 38). 
Despite the 1993 reform, there are still
some people (about 3 percent of the population)
who are left without formal health insurance
coverage. Those who are not formally employed
nor qualify for subsided enrollment receive care
from the network of public healthcare centers
but must pay for their health expenditures out
of pocket (Arbelaez et al.).
The Selection Process for Subsidized
Care
Colombians are selected for the SR if
they are regarded as in the lowest economic
tiers in Colombia. Using the Sistema de Selec-
ción de Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales
(SISBEN) (System for Selecting Beneficiaries of
Social Spending) proxy means test, all Colom-
bians are classified into one of six levels of
socioeconomic well-being. Only the two low-
est levels are allowed participation in the SR.
The SISBEN index was implemented as a means
of determining an equitable and objective meas-
ure of need within society. Based on an assess-
ment of living conditions for individual families,
the SISBEN index takes various household
factors into consideration when determining
socioeconomic condition (World Bank, 2007).
The SISBEN index attempts to measure
poverty using many different qualitative and
quantitative variables. In order to create an
accurate depiction of economic need, factors
used in the SISBEN index must be reliable
and easily identifiable. Thus, the SISBEN index
takes into consideration the following: hous-
ing quality and possession of durable goods,
access to public utility services, human capital
levels, family demographics, unemployment,
and dependency ratios. Possession of durable
goods includes specific qualifying property,
including ownership of the housing site, refrig-
erator, television, fan, and washing machine
(Vélez et al., p. 9). It is important to note that
even though unemployment status is taken into
consideration, income is not due to the lack of
reliable reporting stemming from informal
employment. 
Although the national government is
responsible for determining the criteria used in
the SISBEN selection process, the local munic-
ipal government is responsible for measuring
Colombians’ scores on the SISBEN index and
for selecting the beneficiaries of national gov-
ernment spending. In determining SISBEN
scores, each municipal government conducts
interviews with residents in the poorest areas 
of each community. If a person would like to
interview to qualify as a recipient, he or she can
make an appointment with the local munici-
pal office. Once SISBEN administrators iden-
tify the areas to be surveyed, they personally
103
conduct interviews with the individual house-
holds. When the survey is finished, the respon-
dent in the household signs and then finalizes
the survey (Vélez et al., pp. 8–15).
The SISBEN selection process has been
both praised and criticized for its methods of
evaluation of need. The World Bank fully sup-
ports the use of the SISBEN selection process,
stating that it is a “technical, objective, equi-
table, and uniform mechanism” of selecting
beneficiaries (World Bank, 2007, p. 2). By cre-
ating a uniform selection process, the SISBEN
index is praised for giving ultimate selection
power to the municipal governments, thus pro-
moting democratic governance through partic-
ipation. Increased power given to municipal
authorities is said to have improved the impact
of social spending, because each municipal
authority tailors its own spending distributions
to a budget that works best for it (World Bank,
2007). The SISBEN index has been criticized
because it provides local governments the
authority to manipulate SISBEN data to receive
more funding. The index has also been criticized
for its poor logistical implementation (discussed
later).
Effects of Healthcare Reform
The effectiveness of a universal healthcare
system can be evaluated through its participa-
tion rates. In theory, higher participation in the
healthcare system results in positive healthcare
indicators (such as a higher life expectancy)
for Colombian citizens. Universal healthcare
provides financial protection for those seeking
medical care by spreading the financial risk
associated with costly healthcare over many
individuals. The 1993 reform significantly
decreased the economic barriers to healthcare
for citizens of all income levels, but the poor
were those affected most positively by the imple-
mentation of universal healthcare (World Bank,
2007, p. 3). 
The improved utilization of health services
comes from the SR, which has been called
“one of the most important health interventions
in Latin America” (Gaviria et al., p. 17). Exam-
ining the probability of use for specific services,
authorities can ascertain a measure of success
of universal healthcare. Compared with the
uninsured, the insured population has higher
probabilities of using ambulatory consultations,
bringing sick children to the hospital, giving
birth to children in the attendance of a health
professional, and attending well-child doctor
visits, thus increasing the overall health of the
Colombian population (Gideon and Uribe, p. 6).
Similarly, the insured population has a higher
probability of utilizing preventative care. In
2003, 65 percent of insured people visited a doc-
tor or dentist for preventative reasons whereas
only 35 percent of the uninsured did so (World
Bank, 2007, p. 4). Overall, the healthcare gap
between the rich and the poor has been reduced
significantly as a result of universal healthcare
under the SR and CR (Branco et al., p. 10).
Because there has been a significantly higher
utilization of preventative care and health serv-
ices after the 1993 reform, the universal health-
care reform in Colombia can be considered
effective. Moreover, average life expectancy for
Colombians in January 1993 was 68.87 years
whereas as of 2013 it is 73.43 years. 
Inadequacies within the Healthcare
System
Despite the obvious successes of this sys-
tem, the full potential of developing universal
healthcare has yet to be realized (Miller et al.).
There are still four major inadequacies within
the Colombian universal healthcare system,
which are the result of legal, financial, and selec-
tion processes. These inadequacies hinder the
ultimate success of a universal healthcare plan
in Colombia; they are the protection of consti-
tutional rights, changes in healthcare financ-
ing, selection process for subsidized enrollment,
and participation rates in subsidized and con-
tributory healthcare plans.
Protection of Constitutional Rights
The protection of the constitutional right
to healthcare is a significant issue for Colom-
bian citizens. Because the government guar-
antees a “comprehensive health benefit pack-
age” under Law 100, all Colombians expect
fair and equal healthcare treatment. When a cit-
izen’s right to healthcare has been withheld, a
citizen may initiate a claim for a tutela—a peti-
tion to the federal court arising from the with-
holding of a constitutional right, thus a legal
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inefficiency within the universal healthcare sys-
tem. For instance, a Colombian participating in
the SR could initiate a tutela should the citi-
zen not receive healthcare benefits included
in the SR package, such as assessment of a med-
ical condition, laboratory tests, or medication.
Tutelas can also be claimed for the long waiting
times forced on patients by insurance compa-
nies (Bernal et al., p. 1). Paradoxically, tutelas
can also be claimed for services that are not
included in the standard SR benefit package
(Chernichovsky et al., p. 23). If a Colombian
feels that his or her right to a comprehensive
health benefit package has been compromised
in any way, a petition can be made to the federal
government to receive payments for increased
health benefits (El Congreso . . .).
Tutelas have become increasingly common
since the inception of universal healthcare.
Specifically, since 2000 the frequency of health-
care-related tutelas has dramatically increased
from 21,301 in 1999, to 42,734 in 2002, to
90,000 in 2008 (González and Duran, p. 54). The
federal court frequently rules in favor of the
Colombian citizen, leading to high compensa-
tory expenses for the federal government (Bar-
rero, p. 3). Because healthcare-related tutelas
contribute to such a large percentage of fed-
eral court claims, the Colombian Constitutional
Court required that the national government
correct the failures within the healthcare sys-
tem in 2009 by increasing the benefit package
value for SR members. Compensatory expenses
peaked in 2010, significantly depleting the
solidarity point reserves from CR contributions,
causing a state of social emergency in health
(Chernichovsky et al., p. 10).
Since the implementation of universal
healthcare in 1993, few benefits have been added
to the SR package. In an attempt to redress tute-
las related to the exclusion of healthcare proce-
dures, the federal government recently included
163 new treatments and procedures in the SR
beneficiary plan (with various compliance dates
throughout 2010 and 2011) while at the same
time drastically increasing the total benefit
package per enrolled member, as shown in
Figure 1 (Bernal et al., p. 1).
However, the government was not trans-
parent when it increased the benefit package
value in 2009, and it remains unclear to hos-
pitals how they will be reimbursed for newly
added healthcare services (Bernal et al., p. 2). In
order to manage, and even lower, the number
of tutelas, the government must revise and
expand the package of benefits available to SR
beneficiaries and do so in a comprehensible
manner. Further raising the benefit package
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Figure 1
Value of Total Benefit Package per Enrolled Member
Source: Chernichovsky et al.
value, however, requires immense resources
that the government does not possess. 
Tutelas are the only legal remedy available
to Colombian citizens to gain equitable health-
care and are thus important in protecting citi-
zen’s constitutional rights (Abadia and Oviedo,
p. 1158). Although tutelas are an indication of
the constitutional rights withheld from citizens,
there are many more unreported and undocu-
mented cases of insufficient healthcare. The
growing numbers of tutelas over recent years
indicate that basic care benefits are not suffi-
cient for citizens enrolled in the SR, who expect
to have the right to healthcare.
Changes in Healthcare Financing
Before the reform, the supply-side sys-
tem allocated government funds directly to
healthcare providers. Since the reform, the new
demand-side system has allocated funds and
resources directly to the users of the healthcare
system to then spend on receiving healthcare.
Individuals under the demand-side system are
now subsidized in their purchase of health
insurance with government subsidies financed
from public resources (Miller et al., p. 4). Thus
the demand-side system has put increased pres-
sure on healthcare providers to attract patients,
which is an inherent financial problem under
the 1993 reform. 
The switch from supply-side to demand-
side healthcare economics encourages market
competition among healthcare providers,
because they must now compete against each
other for patients. Thus, the demand-side model
is referred to as the managed competition
model. Under managed competition, there is
increased pressure on healthcare providers to
provide health services at a lower cost, thus
increasing their efficiency and ability to make a
profit. But while managed competition has
the potential to lower costs and reduce unnec-
essary expenditures, it may also lead to con-
siderable inequities in the system (Barona et al.,
p. 44). Although it was the hope of policymak-
ers that managed competition would simulta-
neously lower healthcare costs and increase the
quality of healthcare, the reality is that lower
healthcare costs have decreased the quality of
healthcare received under the subsidized regime
(Trujillo et al.).
Through the demand-side healthcare sys-
tem, competition among hospitals was
increased. Thus, under the 1993 reform, all pub-
lic hospitals were effectively forced to compete
with private hospitals. In an effort to increase
efficiency, public hospitals had to institute
new administrative, accounting, marketing, and
billing procedures, which have proved to be time
consuming and expensive (Barona et al., p. 49).
Similarly, healthcare administrators had to
remain up to date with the logistical aspects
of universal healthcare and transform their
operations accordingly. Not only did public hos-
pitals have to adjust to new administrative
systems but also, more importantly, they had to
adjust to the large influx of new patients. 
More than seven million Colombians were
introduced to the healthcare system under the
1993 reform, and SR participation continues
to grow at a high rate (Barona et al., p. 46).
Although this is a great social accomplishment,
“Colombia does not have the ability to pay for
every intervention for every patient,” admits the
director of the Manager of Health Care Demand
for the Ministry of Social Protection, Lenardo
Cubillos (Tsai, p. 110). The inability of public
hospitals to offer treatment for every patient
is seen by the lack of acceptance of public insur-
ance at many hospitals. Citizens participating
in the SR are entitled to receive some health-
care services under the constitution, but they
often do not receive healthcare services due to
limited sources of public financing (Webster,
p. E289). 
Although equity in healthcare theoretically
should exist for all citizens regardless of their
participation in the SR or CR, the extension of
health benefits to all citizens has brought with
it fiscal consequences (Tsai, p. 110). In 2011,
President Santos reported, “Healthcare is not
a business and should not be approached as a
business” (Colombia Reports). However, in
order to create a successful and long-lasting uni-
versal healthcare program, fiscal restrictions
must be imposed on healthcare spending.
Selection Process for Subsidized
Enrollment
A third inadequacy of the 1993 reform is
the selection process for enrollment, which is
an important aspect of universal coverage.
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The selection process for subsidized enrollment,
which uses the SISBEN index, has been criti-
cized for several reasons. Municipal authori-
ties both administer the SISBEN survey and
receive funding. Thus, incentives exist to over-
state the need for funding. As more needy
municipalities are given more funding, there are
strong incentives for municipal authorities to
manipulate SISBEN eligibility data to appear
more in need of federal funds than is the case.
Weak federal monitoring and evaluation of SIS-
BEN selection data of the 1,098 municipalities
is a cause of poor financial performance and dis-
tribution of government funds. In order for
the system to be successful, the SISBEN index
must be administered and checked by account-
able officials, preferably national government
employees (Castañeda, p. 21).
Additionally, there are many criticisms
of the implementation of the logistical aspects
of the SISBEN index. As local governments
identify households to be interviewed, the most
rural areas and isolated communities are often
ignored in the process. Although citizens have
the right to request an interview for the SISBEN
selection process, those living in rural and
isolated communities may not be aware of their
right to be interviewed or even their right to
healthcare. Because local governments hold
ultimate authority over the beneficiary selection
process, complainants often note that certain
communities receive preferential treatment
over others. Lastly, as population centers vary
with respect to urban and rural areas, it is ques-
tionable whether the uniform SISBEN interview
is suited to the aggregate needs of each and
every household (Barona et al., p. 46).
Participation in the Subsidized and
Contributory Programs
A final inadequacy of the 1993 reform is
the proportion of the population affiliated
with each healthcare regime. From 2002 to
2008, there was a significant increase in the pro-
portion of the population affiliated with the SR,
while there was a simultaneous decrease in
the proportion of the population affiliated
with the CR, as shown in Figure 2. Changing
participation rates in the subsidized and con-
tributory regimes have caused a funding defi-
ciency throughout the past decade, with Colom-
bia experiencing its largest healthcare deficit in
2010 due to the significant depletion of its
reserve SR healthcare funds. However, the
changing affiliation rates associated with each
regime indicate that healthcare coverage is
expanding to include the previously uninsured
population. As healthcare coverage approaches
100 percent, it becomes more costly for the 
government to finance healthcare, and thus 
the depletion of SR funds has occurred. Still,
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Figure 2
Percentage of the Population Affiliated with Each Regime
Source: Calderón et al.
changing SR and CR affiliation rates can be
viewed as a positive indicator of the effective-
ness of healthcare reform.
With insufficient funding, the effectiveness
of universal healthcare is limited (Clavijo and
Torrente, p. 537). To face the growth in the SR
and the decrease in the CR, government officials
had to increase the percentage contribution of
the solidarity point from 1 percent to 1.5 per-
cent in 2007 (Conferencia Interamericana de
Seguridad Social). So as not to increase the
tax burden on salaried employees, this extra 0.5
percentage point tax was added to employer pay-
roll tax contributions. As healthcare costs
increase, an increase in SR participation and
decrease in CR participation imply that subsi-
dies to SR members cannot be raised without
higher taxes (Chernichovsky et al., p. 32). 
Conclusion
Solving the inefficiencies present in
Colombia’s universal healthcare system will
require an influx of funding. In 2011, univer-
sal healthcare cost Colombia 6.1 percent of its
GDP (World Bank, 2013). However, other coun-
tries with universal healthcare regimes spend
on average much more of their GDP on health-
care. For instance, the United Kingdom, Ger-
many, Canada, and France together spend an
average of 10.8 percent of their GDP on health-
care (World Bank, 2013). Each of these coun-
tries differs in its funding models, but each
strives to achieve universal coverage. Thus, in
order to improve the overall efficiency of Colom-
bia’s universal healthcare system, Colombia
must increase the level of funding for univer-
sal healthcare to a level that approaches health-
care expenditures in those countries with suc-
cessful universal healthcare systems. 
While the population coverage under the
SR more than doubled from 2002 to 2009, gross
healthcare expenditure as a percentage of GDP
increased by only 25 percent (Joint Learning
Network . . .). Although a large increase in
healthcare spending is necessary, Colombia had
a 2.9 percentage budget deficit in 2011
(Jaramillo and Schmidt, 2012). In order to cover
the aggregate needs of the SR population as well
as improve the quality of care under the SR to
approach the level of care offered under the CR,
healthcare funding must be increased by a few
percentage points of Colombia’s GDP, perhaps
making Colombia’s total healthcare expendi-
tures around 9 percent of its GDP. A moderate
increase in healthcare spending is a feasible goal
and should ideally be achieved over a manage-
able horizon, approximately ten years. Raising
the level of healthcare spending will help elim-
inate the legal, organizational, selection, and
financial inefficiencies that currently exist in
Colombia’s universal healthcare system. 
Increased funding to the healthcare
budget would allow a higher benefit package
value to be provided to SR patients as well as a
higher quality of care, thereby likely lessening
the frequency of tutelas. More funding to the
healthcare budget would also help solve pub-
lic hospitals’ financial problems arising from
demand-side healthcare. Allocating funds to
public hospitals would help public hospitals
institute new administrative, accounting, mar-
keting, and billing procedures, allowing them
to become more efficient and handle a higher
volume of patients. Public hospitals would thus
be better equipped to compete with private hos-
pitals under the managed-competition model.
Additionally, with more funding, it is also less
likely that municipalities would need to com-
pete with each other for a relatively small
funding budget. By lowering the incentives to
manipulate SISBEN eligibility data, increased
healthcare funding has the potential to solve
selection process inefficiencies under the cur-
rent system. Lastly, with increased funding, par-
ticipation rates under the SR and CR become
less important. As long as there is adequate
funding, increased participation in the SR would
simply signal that the universal healthcare pro-
gram is becoming more successful. 
Although inefficiencies exist under the
universal healthcare system, Colombia is mak-
ing great strides in ensuring equity for its citi-
zens under Law 100. The one-time, comprehen-
sive approach of implementing universal
healthcare drastically increased healthcare cov-
erage rates and provided financial protection to
those enrolled in the SR. The success of Colom-
bia’s healthcare system is dependent on Colom-
bia’s ability to efficiently allocate resources to
its population and, ultimately, to increase fund-
ing to the universal healthcare system. 
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